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Abstract 
 
Data breaches represent one of the main concerns 
for executives across all sectors. Data breaches open a 
period of crisis for the affected firm and require them 
to disclose complex information to a variety of 
stakeholders in a timely and proper manner. This 
paper investigates the relationship between social 
media disclosure of a data breach and its cost, as 
proxied by the response of the affected firm’s stock 
price. Using an event study methodology on a sample 
of 32 data breaches from 29 US publicly-traded firms 
from 2011 to 2014, we find that social media 
disclosure exacerbates the negative stock price’s 
response to the announcement. However, such a 
negative association is contingent on firm’s visibility 
on traditional media with social media disclosure 
having a beneficial effect for low-visibility companies. 
 
 
1. Introduction  
 
The amount of data organizations collect, store and 
process for their daily activities has grown 
exponentially in the last few years [29]. This data 
usually contains valuable information that is attractive 
to cyber criminals. As such, firms are heavily investing 
in ways to protect their information systems (IS) from 
cyber attacks [45]. According to Privacy Rights 
Clearinghouse, 543 million records were lost between 
January 2005 and January 2012 as a consequence of 
2,800 data breaches [37]. Data breaches are costly 
events for the affected firms and estimating such costs 
is challenging as they comprise largely implicit costs 
e.g. loss in customers’ trust and brand reputation [18, 
20]. Empirical researchers attempt to overcome this 
issue by adopting stock price reaction as a proxy [18, 
20] and show that a breach may cause a loss in firm 
value of up to 5.5 percent [7]. Given this significant 
impact, it is not surprising that data breaches are a real 
concern for firms, investors and regulators. Regulators 
have tried to limit the harm of data breaches for 
affected individuals, investors and stakeholders by 
enforcing a mandatory and timely disclosure for such 
events. However, data breaches generate complex 
information and therefore how such information is 
disclosed, is important in this context [12, 47]. 
Historically, firms relied on traditional media (i.e. 
the press) to disseminate information [6]. But 
traditional media tends to focus on highly visible firms 
since they attract larger readership [5]. As a result, low 
visibility firms, which represent the largest part of the 
market, struggle in reaching a larger set of stakeholders 
through traditional media. In this context, the 
emergence of social media represented a structural 
change in corporate communication, and particularly 
for low visibility firms, since it offers firms the 
opportunity to communicate more effectively at 
relatively low cost. 
Previous studies suggest a positive effect of social 
media adoption in improving customer engagement 
[37], constraining negative outcomes caused by 
product recalls [30], detecting customer complaints 
regarding product defects [2], increasing equity market 
value [42], and lowering information asymmetry [6]. 
Despite these advantages, some studies advise caution 
in how the value of social media is measured since 
social media per se cannot generate value without the 
implementation of an adequate communication strategy 
[25]. In addition to firms, policymakers and regulators 
have acknowledged the increasing importance of social 
media for corporate information disclosure, and have 
recognized it as an official communication channel 
[41].  
Social media represents a useful communication 
channel in the context of a company crisis [30], which 
is defined as “a specific, unexpected and non-routine 
event or series of events that create high levels of 
uncertainty and threaten, or are perceived to threaten, 
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an organization’s high priority goals” [40]. Given the 
unexpected nature and the extent of the potential 
damage, a data breach arguably fits into such a 
definition. Social media allows a breached firm to 
bypass information intermediaries and easily 
disseminate its intended message, potentially lowering 
the cost of the breach and exposure to litigation risk 
[36]. However, there is also a potential counter effect. 
Due to the virality typical of social media platforms, a 
company may lose control of the information flow, 
thereby in fact worsening an already serious situation 
[9, 30]. Understanding social media usage around data 
breaches is therefore critical for firms that suffer data 
breaches and this study aims to shed light on its 
potential contrasting impacts. 
To our knowledge, this is the first study that 
investigates the impact of data breach disclosure via 
social media on stock market reaction. We therefore 
provide novel and important insights for management 
into communications strategy around data breaches. 
Our study also contributes to the literature on the 
impact of social media for crisis communication in two 
key ways. First, by investigating the role of social 
media in the context of data breach disclosure; and 
second, by providing unique evidence of a significant 
benefit to social media for low visibility firms in 
particular, which typically struggle in gaining attention 
in traditional media. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. The 
next section provides a review of the essential 
literature while the following section presents our 
research hypotheses. We then describe the research 
design and the data collection. Finally, we present the 
results of the empirical analyses and the robustness 
tests, and conclude by discussing the implications of 
the study and directions for future research. 
 
2. Background  
 
2.1. Data breaches 
 
A data breach is defined as an incident that 
involves unauthorized access to sensitive, protected, or 
confidential data resulting in the compromise or 
potential compromise of confidentiality, integrity, and 
availability of the affected data [22]. The number of IS 
breaches is growing every year and the increasing 
popularity of cloud computing, mobile devices and big 
data exacerbate this issue [1]. 
Data breaches impose both short and long term 
costs on the affected companies. Short-term costs are 
due to investigation and remediation activities, legal 
advisory, fines, and lost transactions. Long-term costs 
are related to loss of present and future revenues as 
well as the deterioration of customers’ and partners’ 
trust [20]. A prominent example of the cost of a data 
breach is ChoicePoint. In early 2006, the Federal Trade 
Commission (FTC) imposed a $10 million fine against 
ChoicePoint as a consequence of a massive data breach 
that involved 160,000 records; the company also 
agreed to pay another $5 million to compensate 
affected individuals [17]. Research into the economics 
of information security provides evidence on both 
determinants and deterrents, and consequences of 
security breaches. Investments in cyber-security [21], 
effective internal controls [9], adequate vendors 
policies [21] and external monitoring [39], users’ 
behaviors [35], and domestic and international law 
enforcement [34] proved to constrain the number of 
security breaches. From a consequences perspective, 
most of the empirical research to date attempts to 
estimate the overall cost of breach events by adopting 
the change in stock price following the announcement 
(i.e. cumulative abnormal returns) as an appropriate 
proxy. This assumption is based on the semi-strong 
market efficiency hypothesis [15] according to which 
the stock price incorporates all public information and 
all future expected firm cash flows. However, even 
though empirical results, thus far, suggest a negative 
impact, evidence on the magnitude is mixed with price 
decline values ranging from 0.86 [18] to 5.5 percent 
[7]. Gordon et al. [22] argue that such conflicting 
results may be due to differences in the sample 
composition or in the period of analysis with more 
recent data breaches causing a lower negative market 
reaction. 
A factor that significantly affects the overall costs 
of data breaches is the amount of time between the 
beginning of the breach activity and its detection as 
well as the time between the breach detection and its 
disclosure [36]. Furthermore, investigating a data 
breach is a complex process and often requires a 
significant amount of time and deep technical 
capabilities [8]. As a result, details about the incident 
may not become apparent or public for some time 
resulting in uncertainty during this period. Similarly, 
the explanation surrounding the data breach 
announcement may be complex. This uncertainty and 
complexity is likely to adversely affect the market 
reaction [26]. 
 
2.2. Social media  
 
Social media represents one of the most 
transformative impacts of information technology and 
has fundamentally changed the way we communicate, 
collaborate, consume, and create content [13]. Social 
media research is still at an early stage of 
conceptualization and due to the rapid evolution of 
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social media platforms, a degree of definitional 
ambiguity exists. Lynn et al. [31] suggest that there are 
three definitional perspectives – the application view, 
the communication view and the integrative view. For 
the purposes of this paper, we use the integrative view. 
From this perspective, social media is defined as both 
the conduits and the content disseminated through 
interactions between individuals and organizations 
[28]. As such, it includes a set of web-based and 
mobile tools and applications that allow users to create 
(consume) content that can be consumed (created) by 
others and which enables and facilitates connections 
[24].  
Social media allows firms to overcome one of the 
main limitations of traditional media (e.g. newspapers): 
limited coverage [10]. Media coverage is often related 
to size, with larger firms having higher visibility and 
greater access both to media outlets and their audiences 
[9]. Network (and audience) accessibility combined 
with the ability for users to generate and share content 
distinguishes social media and traditional media [30]. 
Social media allows both large and small firms to 
directly engage with end-consumers in an efficient way 
[27]. However, social media represents a challenge 
from a firm perspective since messages can be 
propagated, attenuated, and amplified by users 
themselves [3]. This requires a shift in a firms’ 
communication strategy as well as adequate resources 
invested in managing social media [19]. 
Academic research on the impact of corporate 
disclosures via social media on the stock market has 
grown in recent years. Many studies focus on Twitter 
since it is the most commonly adopted for social 
investor communication and company event disclosure 
[6, 25]. Compared to other widely adopted social 
media platform (e.g. Facebook), Twitter has the 
peculiarity of being a largely open network and it also 
has the unique feature of ‘retweeting’, which makes it 
a powerful mechanism for information sharing [28]. 
Empirical studies on the impact of Twitter on stock 
market suggest that the emotionality [49] and 
sentiment [43] of tweets affect stock market returns, 
and that additional dissemination of firm-initiated news 
via Twitter is associated with lower information 
asymmetry [6].  
More recently, studies have begun to investigate the 
impact of social media around specific scheduled 
events such as earnings announcements [25, 44, 47], 
while Lee et al. [30] investigate the economic impact 
of social media in the context of a company crisis. The 
authors adopt product recalls as an example of 
company crisis and their findings suggest that the 
disclosure of the recall through Twitter mitigates the 
negative price reaction when the recalling firm can 
control the information flow. Like product recalls, data 
breaches represent firm crises, which expose affected 
firms to a number of potential negative consequences. 
As such, they contrast with many corporate events 
where there are varying degrees of expectations and 
provide an ideal setting to examine the role of social 
media usage as a firm communication channel. Despite 
these similarities, product recalls and data breaches 
differ in terms of number of occurrences and number 
of people affected, with data breaches typically 
affecting a larger number of organizations and 
individuals than product recalls1. Furthermore, the 
increasing complexity and pervasiveness of data 
breaches, as well as the lack of a clear guidance for 
their disclosure2, make managers consider data 
breaches more concerning than product recalls because 
of the combination of higher likelihood and potential 
damages [36]. 
 
3. Hypotheses development 
 
Disseminating information around a breach event 
quickly is a requirement under compliance with the 
Security Breach Notification Laws (SBNLs). Although 
the disclosure of a data breach is mandatory, the 
communication of the event on social media is 
voluntary. Firms are likely to use voluntary disclosure 
to share positive news while they are more reluctant to 
voluntarily disclose bad news both on traditional [32] 
and social media [14]. Since a data breach is bad news, 
and with this bad news being broadcast to a wide 
audience using social media, we expect the negative 
price reaction to the announcement to be larger if a 
firm discloses the event through its social media 
account. Our first hypothesis is therefore stated as 
follows: 
H1: The disclosure of data breaches on social 
media increases the negative stock price reaction to 
data breach announcements. 
As discussed in the previous section, traditional 
media accommodates high visibility firms, while low 
visibility firms struggle in reaching a large audience 
with their company specific news [5]. This may be 
particularly detrimental when information has to be 
disclosed quickly, as in the case for data breach events. 
                                                
1 Privacy Rights Clearinghouse reports 2,197 data breaches from 
2011 to 2014 while the Consumer Product Safety Commission 
2 While product recalls in the US have been regulated nation-wide 
since 1972 (Consumer Product Safety Act), a unique regulation for 
data breach disclosure is still missing. Since 2002, when the first 
SBNL was enacted California, 47 states Forty-seven states, the 
District of Columbia, Guam, Puerto Rico and the Virgin Islands have 
enacted their own SNBLs [33]. However, SBNLs still significantly 
differ from each other creating uncertainty in terms of disclosure 
requirements [46]. 
Page 4774
  
The risk is that low visibility firms, though they detect 
the breach quickly, cannot disseminate the event 
information effectively because they do not command 
enough attention in traditional media and, therefore, 
face larger relative damage. Social media levels the 
playing field somewhat by providing low visibility 
firms direct access to a potentially wider audience and 
a greater prospect of market attention than would 
otherwise be possible [30]. As such, it provides the 
affected firm with an opportunity to disclose data 
breach event information in a more effective manner. 
Given this important innovation provided by social 
media, we test whether there is a difference in market 
reaction between high and low visibility firms. Our 
contention is that, in contrast to high visibility firms, 
low visibility firms benefit from having the level of 
market attention afforded by its social media presence, 
over and above the case of either no traditional media 
or very limited traditional media news coverage. For 
high visibility firms, a social media presence simply 
adds to an already established level of market attention. 
We therefore state our second hypothesis as follows: 
H2: The disclosure of data breaches on social 
media by low visibility firms decreases negative stock 
price reaction to data breach announcements. 
 
4. Research methodology  
 
In this study we adopt an event study methodology 
based on the efficient market theory which states that 
new information in the market will fully reflect in a 
firm's stock price [15]. Because the market should not 
be capable of anticipating when firms will make a data 
breach announcement, it is appropriate to use the event 
methodology to catch unexpected business events in 
the stock market [11].  
The following regression model is used to test our 
research hypotheses: 𝐶𝐴𝑅!,! = 𝛼! + 𝛼!𝑇𝑤𝑒𝑒𝑡𝐸𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑡!,! + 𝛼!𝐿𝑜𝑤!,!                  +𝛼!𝑇𝑤𝑒𝑒𝑡𝐸𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑡!,!×𝐿𝑜𝑤!,!                  +𝛼!𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠!,! + 𝜀!,! (1) 
The dependent variable in Eq. (1) is the cumulative 
abnormal return (CAR) over a two- (0;+1) or three-day 
(0;+2) period starting on the announcement day 
(hereafter, the event period) [18]. We adopt the market 
model [14] to estimate daily abnormal returns (ARs) 
and then sum up the daily ARs over the event period to 
obtain the cumulative abnormal returns (CARs), which 
is proxy for price reaction to the announcement [7, 18]. 
The market model equation is as follows: 𝑅!,! −  𝑅𝐹! = 𝛼! + 𝛽!(𝑅𝑀! − 𝑅𝐹!) + 𝜀!,! (2) 
where Ri,t is the stock return for firm i on day t; RFt is 
the risk-free interest rate on day t; RMt is the stock 
return of market on day t; αi is Jensen’s alpha for firm 
i; βi is the Capital Asset Pricing Model’s slope 
parameter for firm i (i.e., the systematic risk of the 
return of firm i, relative to the return of the entire 
market, and often denoted as the beta of the stock); and 
εit is the model’s error term. 
To capture the effect of a data breach disclosure on 
social media on price reaction, we adopt two indicator 
variables (i.e. TweetEvent and Low) and the interaction 
variable between them. TweetEvent is a dummy 
variable equal to 1 if a firm disclosed a data breach 
through its active Twitter account and 0 otherwise. We 
classify the firms in our sample as low visibility (Low) 
if the average daily number of newspaper articles 
during the estimation period was below the first tercile 
threshold. The interaction variable  (Twitter x Low) 
allows us to explore if there is a difference in the 
communication use of Twitter in data breach disclosure 
for low visibility firms relative to high visibility firms. 
The regression coefficient of TweetEvent tests H1, 
while the regression coefficient of the interaction 
variable tests H2. 
Our models include four categories of control 
variables: (a) controls for breach characteristics; (b) 
controls for traditional media activity; (c) controls for 
social media activity; and (d) controls for firm 
characteristics.  
The cost of a data breach, and, therefore, the market 
reaction to the announcement, depends on the breach 
type, the number of records breached, and the 
occurrence of previous breaches [5, 6]. Thus, our 
model includes seven dummy variables identifying six 
different breach types as reported by the Privacy 
Rights Clearinghouse3: (a) a payment card fraud 
(Card), (b) an unintended information disclosure 
(Disc), (c) an attack by a hacker (Hack), (d) an insider 
misbehavior (Insd), (e) a lost, discarded or stolen 
portable device (Port), and (f) an unknown reason 
(Unkn)4; and two dummy variables, RecordsKnown 
and PriorBreach, indicating whether a firm disclosed 
the exact number of breached records or whether it had 
suffered previous breach(es) before respectively. 
A control variable for traditional media activity 
(ATMedia) was constructed as suggested by Lee et al. 
[11]. 𝐴𝑇𝑀𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑎!,! = 𝑇𝑀𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑎!,! − 𝑁𝑇𝑀𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑎!,!𝑁𝑇𝑀𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑎!,!  (3) 
                                                
3 https://www.privacyrights.org/node/1398. 
4 The Privacy Right Clearinghouse classification includes two more 
breach categories i.e. physical loss (Phys) and stationary device 
(Stat). Since none of the events in our sample fall into these 
categories, we do not create any indicator variable for them. 
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Where TMedia is the average daily number of 
newspaper articles during the event period (0;+1) while 
NTMedia is the average daily number of newspaper 
articles during a 120-day estimation period ending five 
days before the event (-125;-6). This variable provides 
a measure of the abnormal attention a firm attracts 
around a data breach announcement. 
Control variables for social media activity include a 
variable to control for a firm Twitter activity around 
the announcement (ATweet) and a proxy for a firm’s 
social media audience (Followers). While Followers is 
log-transformed to reduce the variance of the 
distribution, ATweet is defined as follows: 𝐴𝑇𝑤𝑒𝑒𝑡!,! = 𝑇𝑤𝑒𝑒𝑡!,! − 𝑁𝑇𝑤𝑒𝑒𝑡!,!𝑁𝑇𝑤𝑒𝑒𝑡!,!  (4) 
Where Tweet (NTweet) is the average daily number of 
tweets generated by the Twitter account of firm i 
during the event period (estimation period) for event j. 
Finally, include control variables for firms’ 
characteristics such as (i) size, as proxied by total 
assets (Size), the cost of a data breach might be 
different for small and large firms [5]; (ii) growth 
expectations, as proxied by the market-to-book ratio 
(Growth), since firms with higher growth opportunities 
might suffer larger negative market reaction [5]; and 
(iii) industry-related security expectation (HighExp) 
since firms operating in financial services and data 
processing are expected to meet high security standards 
[18]. 
 
5. Sample and data  
 
We build our sample starting from the list of 
breaches that occurred from January 2011 to December 
2014 as compiled by Privacy Rights Clearinghouse5. 
While the number of Twitter users has increased since 
2010 [30], the actual number of tweets, which denotes 
the real activity, only increased dramatically in 20116. 
For this reason we adopt 2011 as the starting year of 
our sample. 
The initial event list included 2,257 breaches. 
Being interested in analyzing the stock price reaction 
to the announcement, we deleted all events that 
affected non-publicly traded companies (2,034). We 
then searched on Lexis-Nexis to determine if any 
newspaper reported an event in our sample before the 
official announcement date and, if this was the case, 
we adjusted the event date to the date of this first 
                                                
5 http://www.privacyrights.org/data-breach. This dataset has been 
adopted in other recently published studies (e.g. [38]).  
6 According to Twitter statistics, the number of tweets per day was 
35 million in 2010, and 200 million in 2011. See 
https://blog.twitter.com/2010/measuring-tweets for further details. 
newspaper article. This occurred for 14 events. We 
also used Lexis-Nexis to check whether any 
confounding event or information leakage 7 occurred in 
a seven-day period before the announcement of a given 
breach. 57 events were excluded on this basis. In case 
of multiple events for the same firm, we required the 
events to be at least 130 days apart from each other. 
This was necessary to avoid any biases in the defined 
estimation periods; we excluded 47 events that did not 
meet this condition. In order to ensure a sample of 
comparable events, we excluded 9 events that were 
announced during weekends or public holidays. 
We searched for the main Twitter accounts or for 
customer services Twitter accounts on the firms’ 
websites and then used Twitter advanced search to 
check whether the firms tweeted about the data 
breach8. When a firm had both active main and 
customer service Twitter accounts, we considered only 
the customer service accounts as this would more 
likely be targeted by customers’ complaints. Finally, 
given that SBNLs were enacted in different years 
across different states, we checked that all firms in our 
final sample were subject to mandatory disclosure 
when the breach occurred. Finally, we excluded 23 
events because of missing values. Our final sample 
includes 32 events corresponding to 29 firms9. Table 1 
summarizes the sampling process. Table 2 provides 
relative frequencies of events over time, while Table 3 
reports the number of events per breach type. 
For this study we retrieved data from three other 
sources. Daily stock price and market index data was 
sourced from Thomson Reuters Datastream. To collect 
the number of newspaper articles we searched for 
company name or ticker symbol in the headlines or the 
lead paragraph of newspaper articles using Lexis-Nexis 
PowerSearch [30]. The Twitter data came from 
TwitterCounter, which provides daily statistics on 
active Twitter accounts. TwitterCounter statistics 
include the daily number of tweets generated from a 
specific account as well as the daily number of 
followers and followings. 
 
                                                
7 We consider confounding events all earnings announcements, 
merger and acquisitions news or rumors, CEO and/or top executive 
turnover. We checked for information leakage in both newspaper 
articles and in the tweets generated from or mentioning the company 
account. 
8 We searched whether any tweet was generated from the official 
Twitter account containing the following keywords in the event 
period ‘breach OR breached OR breaches OR hacker OR hacked OR 
attack’. All the tweets retrieved were manually inspected to ensure 
that they were related to the announcement of the data breach that 
affected the company that generated the message. 
9 The limited sample size reflects the data availability and the need to 
apply adequate filters in order to reduce possible noise. Both the 
sampling criteria and the size of our sample are in line with previous 
studies on the same topic e.g. [7, 18, 22, 38]. 
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Table 1. Sample definition 
Filters No. of Events 
Events reported by Privacy Rights 
Clearinghouse (2011-2014) 2,257 
Non-publicly traded firms (2,034) 
Events with possible confounding 
announcements  (57) 
Events overlapping (47) 
Announcement during weekends or 
public holidays (9) 
Missing data (23) 
Without Active Twitter account (55) 
Final Sample 32 
Number of firms 29 
 
Table 2. Events distribution by year 
Year   No. of Events % 
2011   8 25.00% 
2012   9 28.14% 
2013   8 25.00% 
2014   7 21.86% 
Total   32 100.00% 
 
Table 3. Events distribution by breach type 
Type of Breach   No. of events % 
Payment card Fraud   2 6.25% 
Disclosure   2 6.25% 
Hacker   15 46.88% 
Insider   7 21.88% 
Portable device   3 9.38% 
Unknown   3 9.38% 
Total   32 100.00% 
  
6. Findings 
 
Table 4 shows the descriptive statistics of the 
variables included in our regression models. We 
Winsorized all continuous variables at 1 and 99 percent 
to avoid outliers that could alter the results. The 
average price drop during the event period (CARs) is 
1.4 percent. The average value of ATMedia reveals that 
traditional media pays significant attention to data 
breaches since the number of newspaper articles 
concerning the events in our sample increases, on 
average, by 36 percent in the event period. Looking at 
social media activity, results show that breached firms 
increase their social media communication (i.e. 
tweets), on average, by 10 percent, but only 9 percent 
of firms with an active Twitter account decide to 
disclose the event through their account suggesting 
opportunistic behavior in social media communication 
[25]. Given the limited number of characters allowed 
in a tweet (140) and the complexity of the information 
to be disclosed, these tweets tend to not provide details 
regarding the incident occurred and to link back to a 
more comprehensive text on the firm’s website. An 
exemplar case is the tweet posted by The Home Depot 
(@HomeDepot) when its payment card system was 
breached in 2014 which reports the following: “To 
keep customers updated, we’ve posted a message about 
news reports of a possible payment data breach 
thd.co/update”. Our regression analysis aims to clarify 
whether those firms which do not disclose a data 
breach on social media choose the right option or not. 
Table 4 also reveals that the number of records 
breached is disclosed for just 35 percent of the events 
in our sample, while almost 44 percent of the events 
are preceded by other breaches. 
 
Table 4. Descriptive statistics 
Variable Mean 
CAR(0,1) -0.018 
Size 9.978 
Growth -0.860 
ATMedia 0.362 
Low 0.333 
ATweet 0.101 
Followers 11.703 
TweetEvent 0.094 
RecordsKnown 0.375 
PriorBreach 0.438 
HighExp 0.188 
N 32 
 
Table 5 reports the CARs over different time 
windows for the full sample (FS), for the subsample of 
firms that disclosed a data breach through their social 
media account (TD) and the subsample of firms that 
did not (NTD). It also reports the p-values of t-test on 
the differences between TD and NTD. Although the 
focus of this study is on the most immediate impact of 
the announcement over the days (0;+1), looking at 
different time windows is useful to investigate whether 
the announcement generates longer-term effects. 
The results in Table 5 show that a data breach has a 
negative and significant impact over a three-day period 
starting at the announcement day (0;+2), but the largest 
Table 5. CARs Analysis 
CAR FS P-Value 
(0,1) -0.016 0.001*** 
(0,2) -0.010 0.046** 
(0,3) 0.007 0.283 
(0,4) -0.002 0.819 
(0,5) 0.015 0.081* 
 TD NTD P-Value 
(0,1) -0.037 -0.014 0.048** 
(0,2) -0.028 -0.008 0.090* 
(0,3) 0.001 0.008 0.736 
(0,4) -0.022 0.000 0.472 
(0,5) -0.009 0.018 0.329 
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price drop occurs over the first two days (0;+1). Firms 
disclosing a data breach on Twitter face larger negative 
returns over the first three days from the announcement 
(0;+2) while there is no significant difference 
thereafter10. Overall, the results of our univariate 
analysis suggest that a data breach announcement 
triggers a short-term negative stock price reaction, 
which is larger when the event the firms discloses the 
event on Twitter. However, the market seems to absorb 
the shock relatively quickly with stock price reaching a 
new equilibrium after for days from the announcement 
(0;+3). 
A correlation analysis was also performed in order 
to verify whether some of the variables included in our 
regression model have a strong correlation. None of the 
coefficients denote a strong correlation excluding 
potential bias in the regression results due to 
multicollinearity [23]. 
Table 6 presents the results of our regression 
analysis. The regression coefficients show that the 
disclosure of a data breach on social media 
(TweetEvent) exacerbates the negative price response 
to the announcement. In particular, the price drops by 
5.2 and 3.4 percent more compared to other companies 
that have an active Twitter account but do not disclose 
the event directly from their account over a two- and 
three-day period respectively. This leads us to accept 
H1 and suggests that spreading bad news to a larger 
audience does not represent a convenient 
communications strategy. However, it seems to be an 
effective strategy for low visibility firms. The 
coefficient of the interaction variable (TweetEvent x 
Low), indeed, shows that the event disclosure through 
the Twitter account of a low-visibility firm mitigates 
the negative price response by 4.4 percent. This result 
leads us to accept H2. However, this effect is 
significant only when the dependent variable is 
CAR(0,1) suggesting that Twitter disclosure of a data 
breach accelerates the movement towards a new price 
equilibrium for low visibility firms.  
Four other factors have a significant effect on the 
most immediate price response to the announcement 
for firms included in this subsample. Firstly, the 
abnormal Twitter communication of a breached firm 
(ATweet) increases the negative price reaction, on 
average, by 10 percent. This result is a clear signal that 
firms tend not to adopt effective communication 
strategies in their social media usage and/or that they 
cannot keep (enough) control of the information flow. 
In other words, the virality of social media overwhelms 
firms’ communication skills. Secondly, the larger the 
audience (i.e. followers), the more negative the price 
                                                
10 We compared the CARs up to ten days after the announcement 
date with similar results. 
response to announcement, as evidenced by the 
negative coefficient of Followers. In particular, the 
result indicates that stock prices decrease, on average, 
by 0.53 percent for every 100 followers. Thirdly, 
breaches caused by payment card frauds (Card) have a 
more negative price response. The coefficient shows 
that this type of breach leads, on average, to a 5 percent 
more negative response compared to the case in which 
the cause of the breach is unknown. This result is 
coherent with previous studies showing that data 
breaches involving confidential data trigger a more 
negative price reaction. Fourthly, abnormal traditional 
media activity (ATMedia) slightly mitigates (0.02 
percent) the negative price reaction to the 
announcement. A possible interpretation of this result 
is that newspaper articles help firms to provide more 
details about the event and potentially soften 
stakeholder negative perceptions. Among the control 
varibales, only ATweet, ATMedia, and Growth have a 
significant impact on the three-day CARs (0;+2). 
 
7. Robustness test 
 
The dependent variable of our regression model is 
the cumulative abnormal returns (CAR). As shown 
above, we estimate CARs based on the Market Model 
[14]. Fama and French [16] propose an alternative 
model to estimate CARs. Their model, known as the 
Three-factor Model, takes into account two factors 
other than the market index return which are the 
difference of returns between (a) firms with small and 
large market capitalization and (b) firms with high and 
Table 6. Regression results 
Variable CAR(0;+1) CAR(0;+2) 
Intercept 0.068 ** -0.030  TweetEvent -0.052 *** -0.034 ** 
TweetEvent x Low 0.044 *** 0.011  ATweet -0.132 ** -0.131 * 
Followers -0.006 *** -0.004  Card -0.042 *** -0.006  Disc 0.022 * 0.030  Hack 0.015 * 0.008  Insd 0.018 * 0.019  Port -0.013  -0.030  RecordsKnown 0.006  0.013  PriorBreach -0.007 -0.016  
ATMedia 0.000 *** 0.000 *** 
Size 0.001 0.001 
Growth 0.000 ** 0.001 *** 
HighExp 0.025 0.023  
Year Fixed-Effects Yes Yes 
R-squared 0.82 0.81 
F-Stat 26.41 23.07 
p-Value 0.000 0.000 
N 32 32 
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low book-to-market ratio.  
In order to ensure that the results of our analysis do 
not depend on the estimation model adopted, we 
estimate CARs using the Three-factor Model and run 
the regression using the new CARs as dependent 
variable. The results of our test (untabulated) show 
that, except for some minor changes in the value of the 
OLS coefficients, all our main findings are confirmed; 
therefore we can conclude that the results of this study 
are robust to the CAR estimation model specification. 
Finally, to ensure that our findings on low visibility 
firms are not driven by the threshold adopted, we 
repeat the analysis adopting a quartile-based 
classification. In this case, low visibility firms are the 
ones with an average daily number of newspaper 
articles during the estimation period below the first 
quartile threshold. Our results (untabulated) are 
unaltered; therefore we can conclude that the results of 
this study are robust to different visibility classification 
criteria. 
 
7. Conclusion 
 
This paper investigates whether communication via 
social media affects the price reaction to a data breach 
announcement. Using a sample of 32 data breaches that 
occurred between January 2011 and December 2014 to 
U.S. publicly-traded firms with an active Twitter 
account, the study demonstrates that disclosing a data 
breach on social media tends to exacerbate the negative 
impact of the announcement on stock price, causing an 
average additional decrease of 5.2 and 3.4 percent over 
a two- (0;+1) and three-day (0;+2) event period 
respectively. Further analyses suggest that the negative 
effect of social media is even more pronounced when 
firms disclose the event through their Twitter account 
(-5.2 percent), when they increase the communication 
via social media (i.e. number of tweets) in the event 
period, and have a larger audience on social media (i.e. 
followers). However, our results also suggest that the 
impact of social media impact is positive for low-
visibility firms. Specifically, social media disclosure of 
a data breach by a low-visibility firm mitigates the 
negative price response by 4.4 percent, and it 
accelerates the movement towards a new price 
equilibrium. 
The contribution of this study is threefold. Firstly, 
the study provides new insights into the cost of data 
breaches by adding the disclosure via social media as a 
new significant factor affecting the price reaction to a 
data breach announcement. In doing so, we provide 
additional evidence on the effectiveness of the use of 
social media for crisis communication. In addition, we 
contribute to the ongoing debate on the net effect that 
social media generates in crisis communication by 
providing evidence of a differential impact based on 
firms’ visibility on traditional media. This represents 
an important contribution to and extension of both the 
literature on crisis communication and that on the 
impact of firm level social media usage. Social media 
usage in firm communication is now commonplace, 
however as yet the academic literature provides little 
guidance on the impact of this communication strategy 
in the context of a company crisis. Our study provides 
evidence and important practical information for firms 
making communication decisions in crises such as 
these. Although there is a generalized positive view on 
the adoption of social media in firm communications, 
managers should also be aware of the challenges that it 
generates, and of the peculiarity of the crisis they are 
dealing with. This is particularly true when dealing 
with negative and complex information that might 
damage the reputation of the company. Managers need 
to carefully assess the risk of losing control of the 
information flow due to the virality of social media and 
to design appropriate communication strategies. 
Secondly, our paper provides further evidence of a 
negative price reaction to data breach announcements 
contributing to the debate about the magnitude of the 
economic impact of data breaches and showing 
additional potential outcomes related to the way the 
information is delivered to the stakeholders. We also 
provide further evidence of investors including the 
possibility of recurring breaches in their expectations 
and penalizing firms affected by breaches involving 
confidential data (i.e. credit cards). 
Thirdly, our study contributes to the research on the 
impact of company disclosure through social media on 
stock market by confirming that it significantly affects 
the stock price and providing evidence of a positive 
impact on low visibility firms in regard of data breach 
announcements. By showing that social media usage is 
likely to either help or hinder a firm in the context of a 
crisis, these results are likely to be useful for industry 
as they highlight the need for a contingent crisis 
communication strategy based on firm visibility and on 
the type of crisis a firm is facing. 
 
7. Limitations and future research 
 
This study is also subject to some limitations that 
might represent avenues for future research. Firstly, 
our analysis considers only Twitter as a social media 
platform. Although Twitter is the most accepted 
platform in the financial community, alternative social 
media platforms (e.g. Facebook) are available to firms 
or indeed firms may decide to disclose events through 
a number of platforms at the same time to reach 
different stakeholders. The use of alternative platforms, 
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potential interconnections between them, and 
stakeholders’ preferences are not considered in this 
study, therefore further research on this would be 
informative. Secondly, our analysis is based on daily 
statistics about the use of social media. It does not 
allow us to investigate the content of the messages 
which might convey more information about the firms’ 
communication strategies. Breached firms might 
provide updates on the incidents or just reply to 
customers’ or investors’ enquiries, but they might also 
attempt to divert followers’ attention away from the 
bad news by issuing other positive announcements. 
Further research in this field would shed additional 
light on firms’ communication strategy around data 
breach announcements and bad news disclosure in 
general. 
Finally, we do not consider whether breached firms 
issue press releases on the announcement day or in the 
following day. Press releases arguably provide more 
information than a Tweet, which is limited to 140 
characters. As such, press releases might reduce 
uncertainty and therefore affect the overall cost of the 
incident. Given the current lack of specific disclosure 
requirements for data breach disclosure, investigate the 
information included in disclosure statements to 
investigate how breached firms communicate the 
incident and whether providing specific type of 
information affect the market response to the 
announcements.  
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